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RECENT DECISIONS
hearing requested by the petitioner.10 Then, too, the parolee might ab-
sent himself as far as possible from the jurisdiction upon receipt of a
notice informing him that his parole was about to be revoked." The
added requirement of notice and hearing to the administrative procedure
of the parole authorities might deter the commission from granting
many paroles that it otherwise would grant. A parole board would nat-
urally hesitate to grant paroles in marginal cases in view of the extra
work involved as well as the added responsibility which would fall on
the board if they restored to a prisoner a status approximating full citi-
zenship by the granting of a parole.1 2  In the opinion of this writer the
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court is sound. A contrary result might
well have resulted in defeating the primary purpose of the parole laws
to aid in the rehabilitation of the convicted person.
JACK L RENNER
J[lMIUN1TY FROM PROCESS
A Cleveland attorney who was also statutory agent of the defendant
corporation, was served with a summons in Akron while accompanying
the president of the corporation to a deposition to which the president
had been subpoenaed. The attorney filed a motion to quash on behalf
of the corporation, on the ground that as a non-resident, present in a
foreign county as an attorney engaged in legal work on behalf of his
client, he was immune from service. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed
the lower courts and denied the motion to quash.'
Two issues confronted the court: (1) is a statutory agent immune
from service of process in a foreign county because he also happens to be
an attorney, and (2) is a non-resident attorney, engaged in legal work
on behalf of his client, immune from civil process?
The Supreme Court held that there is no immunity from service of
process granted to a statutory agent of a corporation merely because he
is an attorney engaged in legal work. The court further held that the
Ohio statute which grants immunity from arrest, clearly does not extend
that immunity to service of process?
It is a general rule that one who is attending court as a party, counsel
or witness in a foreign county is privileged from service of civil process
while going to, attending and returning from court.3 The rule is based
on the necessity for uninterrupted administration of the judicial process.4
" State ex rel. McQueen v. Horton, 31 Ala. App. 71, 14 So.2d 557 (1934).
"Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith v. Hall, 277 Ky. 612, 126 S.W.2d 1056 (1939).
" Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596, 131 N.W. 914 (1911).
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The federal courts have constantly sustained the privilege,5 and the
weight of authority is in accord.6
Statutory and constitutional provisions which provide immunity from
arrest present the problem of the interpretation of "arrest," viz., whether
these provisions also extend immunity from civil process. There is a
diversity of judicial opinion here.7  But the scope of the Ohio "arrest"
statute is made dear by the explanatory provisions of Revised Code
§ 2331.13.8
The court could have reached its decision by merely dedaring that a
statutory agent, (otherwise subject to service) who is also an attorney, is
not immune from service of process while in a foreign jurisdiction. In
going further, the court overruled a long standing decision that had
been made with the same statutory provisions on the books. In that
case, the court said, "We are unanimously of the opinion that the general
assembly neither intended nor attempted to comprehend within the pur-
view of these enactments . . . cases [which] impede or embarrass the
free and complete administration of justice in the courts."9
Perhaps the most apparent and compelling reason for the Court's
going beyond the bounds of necessity was the need to clarify an appar-
ent conflict between the statutes and previous judicial decisions. In
addition, there may have been a desire to bring Ohio into line with the
better reasoned decisions on the interpretation of "arrest" in the im-
munity from arrest statutes.10
'Zumsteg v. American Food Club, 166 Ohio St. 439, 143 N.E. 2d 701 (1957).
2 OHio REv. CODE § 2331.11: "The following persons are privileged from arrest:
... (d) Attorneys, clerks of courts, sheriffs, coroners, constables, criers, suitors,
jurors, and witnesses while going to, attending or returning from court.
OHIO REv. CODE § 2331.13: "Sections 2331.11 to 2331.14 inclusive of the
Revised Code, do not extend to cases of treason, felony, or breach of peace, nor do
they privilege any person specified in such sections from being served with a sum-
mons or notice to appear .. " (emphasis added).
8Hale v. Wharton, 73 Fed. 739 (W.D. Mo. 1896); Brooks v. State, 26 Del. (3
Boyce) 1, 79 Ad. 790 (1911); 42 AM. JuR., Process § 146 (1938).
'Brooks v. State, 26 Del. (3 Boyce) 1, 79 Ad. 790 (1911).
'Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); Schwartz v. Thomas, 222 F. 2d 307(D.C. Cir. 1955); Kollenborn v. Murphy, 118 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Tex. 1954).
'Russel v. Landau, 127 Cal. App. 2d 100, 274 P. 2d 681 (1954); Crusco v. Strunk
Steel Co., 365 Pa. 326, 74 A. 2d 142 (1950); Commonwealth v. Dulles, 181 Pa.
Super. 498, 124 A. 2d 128 (1956); Fishbein v. Thorton, 247 S.W. 2d 404 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952).
Hastings v. Hofstadter, 258 N.Y. 425, 180 N.E. 106 (1932); see Annot., 45 A.L.R.
2d 1100 (1956); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 1470 (1935); Annot., 79 A.L.R. 1214 (1932);
Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1399 (1931).
'For text of statute see footnote 2, supra.
'Andrews v. Lembeck, 46 Ohio St. 38, 43, 18 N.E. 483, 485 (1888).
"
0See 94 A.L.R. 1470 (1935).
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The possible results of the decision are varied. With the instant
statutory interpretation in mind, it seems logical that the special appear-
ance, if the non-resident were present, would -be unavailing. Even if
the court sustained the motion to quash, there would 'be no bar to serv-
ing him with process in a new action while he was still within the juris-
diction.
The result of the case is that substantial justice will still be accorded
the several parties involved in the trial of a lawsuit. Since witnesses are
still immune from service of process by statute, 1 it will not be more
difficult to bring them into a foreign jurisdiction. The others, i.e.,
suitors, attorneys should not be able to escape the necessity of defending
in a legitimate controversy on mere technicalities. While arrest might
subject the court to serious interruption, service of summons in a civil
action could have no such effect. "The proper administration of jus-
tice is protected amply by the immunity from restraint of process by the
statutory privilege granted -by Section 2331.11 Revised Code."12
ALAN ZuERmAN
SOHIO REV. CODE § 2317.29. "A witness shall not be liable to be sued, in a county
in which he does not reside, by being served with a summons in such county while
going to, returning, or attending in obedience to a subpoena."
"Zumsteg v. American Food Club, 166 Ohio St. 439, 445, 143 N.E. 2d 701, 705
(1957).
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